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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
As discussed in part I in the Argument below, the Court 
of Appeals is without jurisdiction over this appeal inasmuch as 
Appellant George F. Naillon ("Naillon") failed to file a notice 
of appeal within thirty days of the November 16, 1992 Order of 
Formal Probate and Appointment of Personal Representative as 
required by Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Naillon's 
Rule 60(b) Motion, filed three months later, on February 16, 
1993, did not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal and 
it should not be allowed to be a substitute for an untimely 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals should dismiss 
Naillon's appeal for lack of jurisdiction where he did not file a 
notice of appeal within thirty days of the Order of Formal 
Probate and Appointment of Personal Representative and where he 
seeks appellate review of this Order by appealing the district 
court's denial of his Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order. 
This question of law is to be considered by the Court de novo, 
under a correctness standard of review. See Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
2. Whether the district court properly exercised its 
discretion to deny a telephonic request for a continuance by 
Naillon's California lawyer and by entering the Order of Formal 
Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative where 
all interested parties received timely notice of the hearing and 
where no objections had been made or filed. This question is 
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reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Hardy v. 
HardV, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989). 
3. Whether the district court properly denied 
Naillon's Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order where the 
Petition did not demonstrate excusable neglect for the delay, and 
where it failed to identify specific evidence that could not have 
been discovered earlier and which would warrant setting aside the 
Order. This question is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules whose interpretation 
is considered by appellee to be dispositive in this appeal are 
listed below. (They are reproduced in the addendum to this 
brief.) 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-401 to -414 (1983) (See Add. A) 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (See Add. B) 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (See Add. C) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court's Order of Formal Probate of the Will of the decedent, 
Mildred Meeks, and the Appointment of appellee Robert Gitlin, as 
Personal Representative of the estate. (R.15-18, see Add. D.) 
Naillon also appeals the district court's Order denying his Rule 
60(b) Petition to Vacate or Set Aside that Order. (R. 150-51.) 
Shortly before the scheduled hearing on the Petition for Formal 
Probate filed by Gitlin, Naillon's lawyer in California 
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telephoned the court and asked that the hearing be continued so 
that his client could retain a Utah lawyer to review the probate 
Petition. The court denied the request for a continuance, noting 
that the Notice of Hearing had been timely sent and that no 
protests had been filed. (R. 18, 162-67, see Add. F and G.) 
Three months later, on February 16, 1994, Naillon filed 
a Petition under Rule 60(b)(1) and (2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to Vacate or Set Aside the Order of Formal Probate and 
Appointment of Personal Representative. (R. 27-29.) On 
September 3, 1993, the District Court entered a Memorandum 
Decision, followed by an Order entered October 12, 1993, denying 
Naillon's petition. (R. 145-48, 150-51, see Add. H and I.) 
On November 10, 1993, Naillon filed a Notice of Appeal 
of the October 12, 1993 Order. (R. 152-53, see Add. J.) On 
December 13, 1993, the Personal Representative filed a Motion for 
Summary Dismissal of Naillon's Appeal on the basis that his 
unsuccessful Rule 60(b) Motion did not extend the time to file an 
appeal of the November 16, 1992 Order of Formal Probate. This 
motion was denied by the Utah Supreme Court on January 25, 1994, 
with the court deferring its ruling on the issue "until plenary 
presentation and consideration of the case. Utah R. App. P. 
10(f)." (SSSL Add. K.) Also on January 25, 1994, the Utah 
Supreme Court ordered this case poured-over to the Utah Court of 
Appeals for disposition. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 19, 1988, the decedent, Mildred C. 
Meeks, executed her Last Will and Testament, and nominated Robert 
Gitlin, a long-time friend and neighbor of Ms. Meeks, as personal 
representative and named him beneficiary of one-half of her 
estate. (R. 7-11.) Another friend of Ms. Meeks, Carol 
Schroader, was named as alternate personal representative and 
beneficiary of the other half of the estate. (R. 7-8.) 
2. Mildred C. Meeks died on August 10, 1992, at the 
age of 81 years. She was a resident of Carbon County, Utah. (R. 
1-2, 16.) 
3. At the time of her death, decedent had no 
surviving spouse, no surviving issue, and no surviving parents. 
Decedent had one sister who survived her, Star Pelton, who 
resides in Idaho. (R. 1-2, 17.) 
4. Appellant George F. Naillon, a resident of 
California, is a nephew of the decedent Mildred Meeks by virtue 
of his being a son of Ms. Meeks other sister, Lucy Naillon, who 
died in 1965. (R. 2, 17.) 
5. On October 27, 1992, Robert Gitlin filed Ms. 
Meeks' Will with the Seventh Judicial District Court in Carbon 
County, Utah, together with a Petition for Formal Probate of Will 
and Appointment of Personal Representative. (R. 1-11.) 
6. On November 5, 1992, the district court sent a 
Notice of Hearing of Mr. Gitlin's Petition to all persons 
entitled to receive notice under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-403, 
including to Naillon. (R. 12-14, see Add. D.) The court's 
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Notice set the hearing for eleven days later on November 16, 
1992, in compliance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-403 and 75-1-401. 
(R. 12, see Add. D.) 
7. At the beginning of the hearing on November 16, 
1992, the Court noted on the record that it had just received a 
telephone call from an attorney in California who claimed to 
represent one of the heirs, George Naillon, and who had requested 
a continuance of the hearing so that Naillon could consult with a 
local attorney about the probate Petition. (R. 163-64, see Add. 
G.) 
8. During the November 16, 1992 hearing, the court 
denied Naillon7s oral telephonic request for a continuance, 
finding that the Petition was verified, that the Notice of the 
hearing had been given in accordance with the rules of procedure, 
and that no protests had been filed. (R. 18, 162-66, see Add. F 
and G.) 
9. At the end of the November 16, 1992 hearing, the 
court found that the October 19, 1988 Will that had been filed 
with the probate Petition was in truth and fact the Last Will and 
Testament of Mildred C. Meeks, and the court then signed and 
entered the order granting the Petition for Formal Probate of 
Will and appointing Robert Gitlin as Personal Representative of 
the Estate in accordance with the Will. (R. 15-18, 162-66, see 
Add. E, F, and G.) 
10. Three months later, on February 16, 1993, Naillon 
filed a "Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order" under Rule 
60(b)(1) and (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 27-29.) 
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Naillon's Memorandum and Affidavit supporting his Petition 
claimed that his excusable neglect, and newly discovered 
evidence, warranted setting aside the November 16, 1992 Order of 
Formal Probate and Appointment of Personal Representative. (R. 
36-53, 116-29.) 
11. The Personal Representative moved to dismiss 
Naillon's Petition on the grounds that (1) the Petition was not 
timely and substantial prejudice would result if the November 16, 
1992 Order was vacated; (2) Naillon had not demonstrated 
excusable neglect for not filing his Petition earlier; (3) 
Naillon had failed to identify specific newly discovered facts 
to justify vacating the November 16, 1992 Order of Formal Probate 
of Will; and (4) Naillon lacked standing to challenge the 
Personal Representative's appointment because Naillon is not a 
beneficiary under the Will and he has no evidence that the Will 
is invalid or that any other Will exists. (R. 64-106, 130-135.) 
The Personal Representative also filed a Motion to Strike certain 
statements in Naillon's affidavit that were made without 
foundation, and that were his conclusory opinions and suspicions, 
and were not based on personal knowledge. (R. 107-11.) The 
Personal Representative also filed an affidavit of Nick Sampinos, 
Esq., who drafted the decedent's will, who testified that the 
decedent was of sound mind and not under duress at the time she 
executed the 1988 Will. (R. 89-92.) 
12. On September 3, 1993, the Honorable Bruce K. 
Halliday of the Seventh Judicial District Court entered a 
Memorandum Decision, followed by an Order entered October 12, 
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1993, denying Naillon's Rule 60(b) petition. (R. 145-48, 150-51, 
see Add. H and I.) The Court did not strike Naillon's affidavit, 
stating that it was able to ferret out the conclusionary matters 
and the statements made without Naillon's personal knowledge. 
(R. 146.) 
13. On November 10, 1993, Naillon filed a Notice of 
Appeal of the district court's October 12, 1993 Order. (R. 152-
53, see Add. J.) No notice of appeal has ever been filed by 
Naillon regarding the district court's November 16, 1992 Order of 
Formal Probate. 
14. Naillon's Docketing Statement and his Brief on 
Appeal identifies the district court's decision denying Naillon's 
requested continuance in connection with the November 16, 1993 
Probate Order as the subject of his appeal and as one of the two 
issues presented for appellate review. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Naillon's appeal is untimely and it should therefore be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appeal seeks to reopen 
the district court's Order of Formal Probate of Will and 
Appointment of Personal Representative. Under Section 75-3-413 
of the Utah Probate Code, an order of formal probate can only be 
modified or vacated within the thirty day appeal time. Naillon 
sought to revive his untimely appeal or to vacate the probate 
order by filing a Petition under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and then filing a notice of appeal after that 
Petition was denied by the district court. This backdoor 
approach to extend the appeal time should not permitted. The 
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Order of Formal Probate was a final, appealable Order on the date 
it was entered, November 16, 1992. Naillon's appeal was not 
filed until one year later, on November 10, 1993. It should be 
dismissed. 
Naillon's appeal seeks reversal of two decisions of the 
trial court on matters that the trial court is given broad 
discretion: whether to grant a continuance and whether to grant a 
Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a final order. The requirements of 
the Probate Code regarding notice, hearing, and contents of a 
Petition for Formal Probate were followed in all respects by the 
Personal Representative and by the district Court. Naillon's 
telephone request for a continuance to get a Utah lawyer did not 
caste any doubt on the merits of the probate petition. Further, 
only written objections to the merits of the probate petition 
would have warranted a further hearing under the Probate Code. 
The court acted within its sound and experienced discretion in 
denying the telephone request. 
Naillon's 60(b) Petition failed to demonstrate that his 
neglect was excusable in waiting for three months to bring his 
concerns about this probate to the attention of the court. 
Furthermore, his Petition did not contain any newly discovered 
evidence to justify reconsideration of the Order of Formal 
Probate. He accuses the Personal Representative of exercising 
undue influence and fraud upon the decedent without citing 
specific, detailed facts, that are based on his personal 
knowledge. Naillon did not bring any competent evidence to the 
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attention of the trial court to support his Rule 60(b) Petition, 
and it was therefore appropriately denied by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Naillon's Appeal is Untimely and Should be Dismissed 
Appellant George Naillon seeks appellate review of the 
district court's Probate Order of November 16, 1993, yet no 
timely notice of appeal has been filed with respect to that 
Order. Further, Naillon's February 16, 1993 Petition under Rule 
60(b) did not extend the time for filing a Notice of Appeal. 
This appellate Court, therefore, is without jurisdiction to 
consider Naillon's appeal. 
Utah law provides that "[f]or good cause shown, an 
order in a formal testacy proceeding may be modified or vacated 
within the time allowed for appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-413; 
see also Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412 ("Subject to appeal and 
subject to vacation as provided in this section and in Section 
75-3-413, a formal testacy order . . . is final as to all persons 
with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate"). 
An "order admitting a will to probate in the course of formal 
testacy proceedings is a final order for purposes of appeal." 
Estate of Christensen v. Christensen, 655 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 
1982) . The "time allowed for appeal" is thirty days. Utah R. 
App. P. 4(a). 
Naillon's Rule 60(b) Petition to Vacate was not filed 
within thirty days of the November 16, 1992 formal probate order 
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-413. Instead, it was filed 
two months late, on February 16, 1993. Even if Naillon's Rule 
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60(b) Petition was timely, it did not extend the time for an 
appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(only timely post-judgment 
motions under rules 50(b), 52(b), and 59 extend the time for 
appeal); Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843, 845 
(1970); Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845, 847 
(1955) . As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Fackrell v. 
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987), a Rule 60(b) motion 
"does not save this appeal and prevents us from reaching the 
merits of the trial court's original order. A Rule 60(b) motion 
does not extend or toll the thirty-day period in which appeals in 
the original action must be filed." 
Without a timely notice of appeal, the appellate court 
is without jurisdiction over the appeal. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 
Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843, 845 (1970). Naillon's appeal of the 
district court's Order entered October 12 denying his Rule 60(b) 
Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order is a transparent attempt to 
appeal the November 16, 1992 Order. Naillon's Docketing 
Statement, and the issues and arguments made in his brief on 
appeal, demonstrates that he is seeking appellate review of the 
November 16, 1992 hearing and Order. As set forth above, he 
should have filed his "Petition to Vacate or Set aside Order" no 
later than thirty days after the court's Order was entered. 
Naillon should not be permitted to use Rule 60(b) to 
circumvent the thirty-day time limit specifically prescribed by 
in Section 75-3-413 of the Probate Code or as a substitute for 
filing a timely appeal. See Laub v. South Central Utah Tele. 
Assoc.. 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982)("court should consider 
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[ ] whether Rule 60(b) is being used as a substitute for 
appeal"); Morse-Starrett Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 205 F.2d 244, 
249 (9th Cir. 1953)(same). If the Court does not dismiss 
Naillon's appeal as untimely, and considers the merits of his 
arguments about the November 16, 1992 Order of Formal Probate, 
precedent would be made that the thirty day appeal time can be 
avoided or extended by at least another three months. Under 
Naillon's approach, a party who files a Rule 60(b) Motion within 
three months after an otherwise final, appealable order, and who 
thereafter files an appeal within thirty days of the denial of 
that Order, may get the appellate court to review the merits of 
the trial court's original order. This back door approach to 
revive untimely issues for appeal is contrary to Section 75-3-413 
of the Probate Code, and the Rules of Civil and Appellate 
Procedure, and it should not be condoned by the Court. 
II. The District Court Properly Denied the Telephonic 
Request for a Continuance by Naillon's California 
Lawyer 
The Utah Probate Code sets forth specific procedures to 
be followed in admitting a will into formal probate and for the 
appointment of a personal representative to administer the 
affairs of the decedent's estate. These procedures were followed 
in all respects by Mr. Gitlin and by the district court. See 
Utah Code §§ 75-3-401 to -414, reprinted at Addendum A, 
On October 27, 1992, Mr. Gitlin filed the Petition for 
Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal 
Representative. (R. 1-11.) The Petition contained all the 
information required under the Probate Code for the Will to be 
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formally probated, including the names and addresses of all known 
heirs, beneficiaries, and interested persons, and the original 
Last Will and Testament of the decedent. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 75-3-401 and -402. On November 5, 1994, Notice of the hearing 
on the Petition was mailed by the clerk of the court to all 
persons listed in the Petition, including to Naillon. (R. 12-14, 
see Add. D.) The Notice was mailed "at least ten days before the 
time set for the hearing," in accordance with Utah Code §§ 75-3-
403 and 75-1-401. 
Mr. Naillon did not file or make any objection with the 
court to justify not accepting the decedent's Will into probate. 
The Utah Probate Code requires that written objections be made: 
"Any party to a formal proceeding who opposes the probate of a 
will for any reason shall state in his pleadings his objections 
to probate of the will." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-404 (emphasis 
added). A telephone request for a continuance of a duly noticed 
hearing is not provided for in the Probate Code, and such a 
request is insufficient to warrant scheduling the matter for 
trial as Naillon suggests on appeal. (Appellant's Brief at 10.) 
Furthermore, Naillon's telephone request, which was made right 
before the hearing was scheduled to start, did not include any 
claim that the Will offered by Gitlin was invalid, that the 
Notice of hearing was improper, or that the Petition was 
defective in any respect. (R.163.) Rather, Naillon's lawyer 
simply sought a continuance of the duly noticed hearing to enable 
his client more time to consult a local attorney about the 
Petition. (Id.) 
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Given these circumstances, the district court acted in 
accordance with the Probate Code in ordering the formal probate 
of the Will and appointing Mr. Gitlin as personal representative. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-409. Naillon cannot reasonably contend 
that this was an abuse of discretion by the court. See Hardy v. 
Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989)(whether to grant 
continuance rests in sound discretion of trial court). The court 
simply followed the procedures outlined in the Code; Naillon did 
not. 
Ill. The District Court Properly Denied Naillon's Rule 60(b) 
Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the Order of Formal 
Probate 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the following with 
regard to judicial review of a Rule 60(b) motion: 
In addition to the concerns that final 
judgments should not be lightly disturbed and 
that unjust judgments should not be allowed 
to stand, other factors the court should 
consider are whether rule 60(b) is being used 
as a substitute for appeal, whether the 
movant had a fair opportunity to make his 
objection at trial, and whether the motion 
was made within a reasonable time after entry 
of judgment. 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's 
Federal Practice U 60.19 (2d ed. 1982). 
Laub v. South Central Utah Tele. Assoc. 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 
(Utah 1982). The Utah Supreme Court has also said that "the 
district court judge is vested with considerable discretion under 
Rule 60(b),. in granting or denying a motion to set aside a 
judgment." Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). 
Naillon asserted excusable neglect and newly discovered 
evidence as the bases for his Rule 60(b) Petition to Vacate or 
Set Aside the November 16, 1992 Order of Formal Probate. Neither 
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basis had merit and Naillon's Rule 60(b) was properly denied by 
the district court. (R. 145-48, 150-51.) 
(1) Naillon Did Not Demonstrate Excusable Neglect 
Naillon argued before the district court, and again 
argues on appeal, that he did not raise his concerns about this 
probate earlier because he could not find a Utah attorney who was 
willing to help him. This may explain why he did not have a Utah 
lawyer appear in person at the November 16, 1992 hearing, but it 
does not explain why he did not come to Utah himself to be 
present at the hearing, or why he did not file any document with 
the court identifying reasons why the Will should not be 
probated. Naillon did neither of these things and has offered no 
reasonable explanation to explain this neglect. "Mere 
inconvenience or the press of personal or business affairs is not 
deemed as an excuse for failure to appear at trial." Valley 
Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 1983). 
Naillon's contention that he contacted thirteen 
attorneys who would not appear on his behalf (Appellant's Brief 
at 9) is more of an indication as to the lack of merit of his 
case than an indication that his neglect was excusable. 
Naillon's Affidavit states that he contacted all these attorneys 
before the November 16, 1992, hearing, not afterwards. (R.49-
50.) There was no indication in Naillon's 60(b) Petition or in 
his Affidavit to justify why he could not have presented his 
concerns about this estate between the time of his aunt's death 
on August 10, 1992 and the hearing on November 16, 1992, nor is 
there any justification why the information could not have been 
14 
gathered and presented within thirty days after the hearing. In 
short, Naillon failed to establish that his neglect in bringing 
his concerns to the attention of the court in a timely manner was 
excusable. 
(2) No Evidence was Presented by Naillon to Warrant 
Setting Aside the Probate Order 
Perhaps the most compelling reason to affirm the 
district court's exercise of discretion in denying Naillon's Rule 
60(b) Motion is the reason given by Judge Halliday in his 
Memorandum Decision: "the Court finds the Affidavit [of George F. 
Naillon] to be insufficient to give rise to a justifiable reason 
for setting aside the original Order of Judge Bunnell." (R. 146-
47.) The court explained further: 
The only factual allegation contained in the 
Affidavit that bears upon some undo influence at the 
time of the execution of the Will is really 
inferential, and that is from the fact that Mr. Gitlin 
was named in the Will as a donee five years ago and was 
named as a grantee in a deed executed seven days prior 
to the decedents death, at a time the Affiant believed 
she may have been in pain and under the influence of 
some unspecified drugs. We are asked to infer that 
Gitlin exercised undue influence over the Decedent's 
execution of the Will. That inference requires a leap 
of faith that this Court cannot make. 
(R. 147-48.) 
In Naillon's Brief on Appeal, he again alludes to 
having recently discovered "evidence of duress, undue influence, 
fraud and other issues which negate the initial findings of the 
Court." Appellant's Brief at 12. Noticeably absent from these 
invidious, conclusory allegations are any citations to the record 
of the trial court. "This Court need not, and will not, consider 
any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record." 
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Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 143 (Utah 
1978); Utah R. App. P. 24(e). Naillon made these same type of 
conclusory accusations in his Affidavit filed with his Rule 60(b) 
Petition, which the district court found unpersuasive (R. 146-
48), and which gave rise to the Personal Representative's Motion 
to Strike. (R.107-111.) The Utah Supreme Court has held that, 
among other requirements, claims of newly discovered evidence in 
a Rule 60(b) motion must be supported by "specific, detailed 
facts," that would justify a trial on the issue raised, not 
unfounded, conclusory allegations such as Naillon has made here. 
State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1983). Given 
Naillon's untimely and inadequate claims, the district court's 
sound discretion in denying Naillon's 60(b) Petition should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court of Appeals should 
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Alternatively, the 
Court should affirm the district court's Order denying Naillon's 
Rule 60(b) Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order of Formal 
Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative. 
DATED this / f day of May, 1994. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
D. Gilson / :ies 
Attorneys for Appellee Robert 
Gitlin, Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Mildred C. Meeks 
193\55916 
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Tab A 
75-3-401. Formal testacy proceedings — Nature — When 
commenced. 
(1) A formal testacy proceeding is litigation to determine whether a dece-
dent left a valid will. A formal testacy proceeding may be commenced by an 
interested person filing a petition as described in Subsection 75-3-402(1) in 
which he requests that the court, after notice and hearing, enter an order 
probating a will, or a petition to set aside an informal probate of a will or to 
prevent informal probate of a will which is the subject of a pending applica-
tion, or a petition in accordance with Subsection 75-3-402(3) for an order that 
the decedent died intestate. 
(2) A petition may seek formal probate of a will without regard to whether 
the same or a conflicting will has been informally probated. A formal testacy 
proceeding may, but need not, involve a request for appointment of a personal 
representative. 
(3) During the pendency of a formal testacy proceeding, the registrar shall 
not act upon any application for informal probate of any will of the decedent or 
any application for informal appointment of a personal representative of the 
decedent. 
(4) Unless a petition in a formal testacy proceeding also requests confirma-
tion of the previous informal appointment, a previously appointed personal 
representative, after receipt of notice of the commencement of a formal pro-
bate proceeding, must refrain from exercising his power to make any further 
distribution of the estate during the pendency of the formal proceeding. A 
petitioner who seeks the appointment of a different personal representative in 
a formal proceeding also may request an order restraining the acting personal 
representative from exercising any of the powers of his office and requesting 
the appointment of a special administrator. In the absence of a request, or if 
the request is denied, the commencement of a formal proceeding has no effect 
on the powers and duties of a previously appointed personal representative 
other than those relating to distribution. 
75-3-402. Formal testacy or appointment proceedings — 
Petition — Contents. 
(1) Petitions for formal probate of a will, or for adjudication of intestacy 
with or without request for appointment of a personal representative, must be 
directed to the court, request a judicial order after notice and hearing, and 
contain further statements as indicated in this section. A petition for formal 
probate of a will: 
(a) Requests an order as to the testacy of the decedent in relation to a 
particular instrument which may or may not have been informally pro-
bated and determining the heirs; 
(b) Contains the statements required for informal applications as 
stated in Subsection 75-3-301(2) and the statements required by Subsec-
tions 75-3-301(3)(b) and (c), and, if the petition requests appointment of a 
personal representative, the statements required by Subsection 
75-3-301(4); and 
(c) States whether the original of the last will of the decedent is in the 
possession of the court or accompanies the petition. 
(2) If the original will is neither in the possession of the court nor accompa-
nies the petition and no authenticated copy of a will probated in another 
jurisdiction accompanies the petition, the petition also must state the contents 
of the will and indicate that it is lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable. 
(3) A petition for adjudication of intestacy and appointment of an adminis-
trator in intestacy must request a judicial finding and order that the decedent 
left no will and determining the heirs, contain the statements required by 
Subsections 75-3-301(2) and 75-3-301(5) and indicate whether supervised ad-
ministration is sought. A petition may request an order determining intestacy 
and heirs without requesting the appointment of an administrator, in which 
case, the statements required by Subsection 75-3-30l(5)(b) above may be omit-
ted. 
75-3-403. Formal testacy proceeding — Notice of hearing 
on petition. 
(1) Upon commencement of a formal testacy proceeding, the court shall fix 
a time and place of hearing. Notice shall be given in the manner prescribed by 
Section 75-1-401 by the petitioner to the persons herein enumerated and to 
any additional person who has filed a demand for notice under Section 
75-3-204. Notice shall be given to the following persons: the surviving spouse, 
children, and other heirs of the decedent, the devisees and executors named in 
any will that is being, or has been, probated, or offered for informal or formal 
probate in the county, or that is known by the petitioner to have been pro-
bated, or offered for informal or formal probate elsewhere, and any personal 
representative of the decedent whose appointment has not been terminated. 
Notice may be given to other persons. In addition, the petitioner shall give 
notice by publication to all unknown persons and to all known persons whose 
addresses are unknown who have any interest in the matters being litigated. 
(2) If it appears by the petition or otherwise that the fact of the death of the 
alleged decedent may be in doubt, or on the written demand of any interested 
person, a copy of the notice of the hearing on the petition shall be sent by 
registered mail to the alleged decedent at his last known address. The court 
shall direct the petitioner to report the results of, or make and report back 
concerning, a reasonably diligent search for the alleged decedent in any man-
ner that may seem advisable, including any or all of the following methods: 
(a) By inserting in one or more suitable periodicals a notice requesting 
information from any person having knowledge of the whereabouts of the 
alleged decedent; 
(b) By notifying law enforcement officials and public welfare agencies 
in appropriate locations of the disappearance of the alleged decedent; 
(c) By engaging the services of an investigator. The costs of any search 
so directed shall be paid by the petitioner if there is no administration or 
by the estate of the decedent in case there is administration. 
75-3-404. Formal testacy proceedings — Written objec-
tions to probate. 
Any party to a formal proceeding who opposes the probate of a will for any 
reason shall state in his pleadings his objections to probate of the will. 
75-3-405. Formal testacy proceedings — Uncontested 
cases — Hearings and proof. 
If a petition in a testacy proceeding is unopposed, the court may order 
probate or intestacy on the strength of the pleadings if satisfied that the 
conditions of Section 75-3-409 have been met or conduct a hearing in open 
court and require proof of the matters necessary to support the order sought. If 
evidence concerning execution of the will is necessary, the affidavit or testi-
mony of one of any attesting witnesses to the instrument is sufficient. If the 
affidavit or testimony of an attesting witness is not available, execution of the 
will may be proved by other evidence or affidavit. 
75-3-406. Formal testacy proceedings — Contested cases 
— Testimony of attesting witnesses. 
(1) If evidence concerning execution of an attested will which is not self-
proved is necessary in contested cases, the testimony of at least one of the 
attesting witnesses, if within the state, competent, and able to testify, is 
required. Due execution of an attested or unattested will may be proved by 
other evidence. 
(2) If the will is self-proved, compliance with signature requirements for 
execution is conclusively presumed and other requirements of execution are 
presumed subject to rebuttal without the testimony of any witness upon filing 
the will and the acknowledgment and affidavits annexed or attached thereto, 
unless there is proof of fraud or forgery affecting the acknowledgment or 
affidavit. 
75-3-407. Formal testacy proceedings — Burdens in con-
tested cases. 
(1) In contested cases, petitioners who seek to establish intestacy have the 
burden of establishing prima facie proof of death, venue, and heirship. Propo-
nents of a will have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due execu-
tion in all cases, and if they are also petitioners, prima facie proof of death and 
venue. Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamen-
tary intent or capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake, or revocation. 
Except in cases where a presumption is operable, parties have the ultimate 
burden of persuasion as to matters with respect to which they have the initial 
burden of proof. Where one or more presumptions are operable, the ultimate 
burden of persuasion shall be determined in accordance with the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
(2) If a will is opposed by the petition for probate of a later will revoking the 
former, it shall be determined first whether the later will is entitled to pro-
bate, and if a will is opposed by a petition for a declaration of intestacy, it 
shall be determined first whether the will is entitled to probate. 
75-3-408. Formal testacy proceedings — Will construction 
— Effect of final order in another jurisdiction. 
A final order of a court of another state determining testacy, the validity, or 
construction of a will, made in a proceeding involving notice to and an oppor-
tunity for contest by all interested persons must be accepted as determinative 
by the courts of this state if it includes, or is based upon, a finding that the 
decedent was domiciled at his death in the state where the order was made. 
75-3-409. Formal testacy proceedings — Order — Foreign 
will. 
After the time required for any notice has expired, upon proof of notice, and 
after any hearing that may be necessary, if the court finds that the testator is 
dead, venue is proper and that the proceeding was commenced within the 
limitation prescribed by Section 75-3-107, it shall determine the decedent's 
domicile at death, his heirs, and his state of testacy. Any will found to be valid 
and unrevoked shall be formally probated. Termination of any previous infor-
mal appointment of a personal representative, which may be appropriate in 
view of the relief requested and findings, is governed by Section 75-3-612. The 
petition shall be dismissed or appropriate amendment allowed if the court is 
not satisfied that the alleged decedent is dead. A will from a place which does 
not provide for probate of a will after death may be proved for probate in this 
state by a duly authenticated certificate of its legal custodian that the copy 
introduced is a true copy and that the will has become effective under the law 
of the other place. 
75-3-410. Formal testacy proceedings — Probate of more 
than one instrument 
If two or more instruments are offered for probate before a final order is 
entered in a formal testacy proceeding, more than one instrument may be 
probated if neither expressly revokes the other or contains provisions which 
work a total revocation by implication. If more than one instrument is pro-
bated, the order shall indicate what provisions control in respect to the nomi-
nation of an executor, if any. The order may, but need not, indicate how any 
provisions of a particular instrument are affected by the other instrument. 
After a final order in a testacy proceeding has been entered, no petition for 
probate of any other instrument of the decedent may be entertained, except 
incident to a petition to vacate or modify a previous probate order and subject 
to the time limits of Section 75-3-412. 
75-3-411. Formal testacy proceedings — Partial intestacy. 
If it becomes evident in the course of a formal testacy proceeding that, 
though one or more instruments are entitled to be probated, the decedent's 
estate is or may be partially intestate, the court shall enter an order to that 
effect. 
75-3-412. Formal testacy proceedings — Effect of order — 
Vacation. 
(1) Subject to appeal and subject to vacation as provided in this section and 
in Section 75-3-413, a formal testacy order under this part, including an order 
that the decedent left no valid will and determining heirs, is final as to all 
persons with respect to all issues concerning the decedent's estate that the 
court considered or might have considered incident to its rendition relevant to 
the question of whether the decedent left a valid will, and to the determina-
tion of heirs, except that: 
(a) The court shall entertain a petition for modification or vacation of 
its order and probate of another will of the decedent if it is shown that the 
proponents of the later-offered will were unaware of its existence at the 
time of the earlier proceeding or were unaware of the earlier proceeding 
and were given no notice of it, except by publication. 
(b) If intestacy of all or part of the estate has been ordered, the determi-
nation of heirs of the decedent may be reconsidered if it is shown that one 
or more persons were omitted from the determination and it is also shown 
that the persons were unaware of their relationship to the decedent, were 
unaware of his death, or were given no notice of any proceeding concern-
ing his estate, except by publication. 
(c) The order originally rendered in the testacy proceeding may be 
modified or vacated, if appropriate under the circumstances, by the order 
of probate of the later-offered will or the order redetermining heirs. 
(d) The finding of the fact of death is conclusive as to the alleged dece-
dent only if notice of the hearing on the petition in the formal testacy 
proceeding was sent by registered or certified mail addressed to the al-
leged decedent at his last known address and the court finds that a search 
under Subsection 75-3-403(2) was made. 
(2) If the alleged decedent is not dead, even if notice was sent and search 
was made, he may recover estate assets in the hands of the personal represen-
tative. In addition to any remedies available to the alleged decedent by reason 
of any fraud or intentional wrongdoing, the alleged decedent may recover any 
estate or its proceeds from distributees that is in their hands, or the value of 
distributions received by them, to the extent that any recovery from distribu-
tees is equitable in view of all the circumstances. 
(3) A petition for vacation under either Subsections (l)(a) or (b) must be 
filed prior to the earlier of the following time limits: 
(a) If a personal representative has been appointed for the estate, the 
time of entry of any order approving final distribution of the estate, or, if 
the estate is closed by statement, six months after the filing of the closing 
statement. 
(b) Whether or not a personal representative has been appointed for 
the estate of the decedent, the time prescribed by Section 75-3-107 when 
it is no longer possible to initiate an original proceeding to probate a will 
of the decedent. 
(c) Twelve months after the entry of the order sought to be vacated. 
75-3-413- Formal testacy proceedings — Vacation of order 
for other cause. 
For good cause shown, an order in a formal testacy proceeding may be 
modified or vacated within the time allowed for appeal. 
75-3-414. Formal proceedings concerning appointment of 
personal representative. 
(DA formal proceeding for adjudication regarding the priority or qualifica-
tion of one who is an applicant for appointment as personal representative, or 
of one who previously has been appointed personal representative in informal 
proceedings, if an issue concerning the testacy of the decedent is or may be 
involved, is governed by Section 75-3-402. as well as by this section. In other 
cases, the petition shall contain or adopt the statements required by Subsec-
tion 75-3-301(2) and describe the question relating to priority or qualification 
of the personal representative which is to be resolved. If the proceeding pre-
cedes any appointment of a personal representative, it shall stay any pending 
informal appointment proceedings as well as any commenced thereafter. If the 
proceeding is commenced after appointment, the previously appointed per-
sonal representative, after receipt of notice thereof, shall refrain from exercis-
ing any power of administration except as necessary to preserve the estate or 
unless the court orders otherwise. 
(2) After notice to interested persons, including all persons interested in the 
administration of the estate as successors under the applicable assumption 
concerning testacy, any previously appointed personal representative and any 
person having or claiming priority for appointment as personal representa-
tive, the court shall determine who is entitled to appointment under Section 
75-3-203, make a proper appointment and. if appropriate, terminate any prior 
appointment found to have been improper as provided in cases of removal 
under Section 75-3-611. 
TabB 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons m an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action: i5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
TabC 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted: (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial: or i2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE : 
ESTATE OF : 
MILDRED C. MEEKS, : 
DECEASED. \ 
: NOTICE 
: Probate No. 923-43 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT ON October 27, 1992, Robert 
Gitlin, whose address is 398 West 2900 South, Price, UT 84501 
filed with the Clerk of the Court a petition praying for: FORMAL 
PROBATE OF WILL AND APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE (A 
copy of the petition is on file with the Clerk of the Court and 
may be reviewed upon request.) 
Hearing on said petition will be had before the 
above-entitled Court in Room 120 of the Carbon County Court 
Complex in Price, Carbon County, State of Utah, on NOVEMBER 
16, 1992, at 9:30 o'clock a.m., at which time and place all 
persons interested in said estate may appear and show cause, if 
any they have, why said petition should not be granted. 
WITNESS the Clerk of said Court and the seal hereof 
affixed this 5th day of November, 1992. 
BARBARA PROCARIONE, CLERK 
( S E A L ) B Y ^ ^ ^ r i . r , ^ 
Clerk 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE : 
ESTATE OF : 
MILDRED C. MEEKS, : 
DECEASED. : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF POSTING 
: AND MAILING 
: Probate No. 923-43 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF CARBON) 
I, Barbara Procarione, being duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
That she is, and at all times herein mentioned, was, 
and now is, the duly appointed, qualified and acting Deputy Court 
Clerk of the District Court: of Carbon County, State of Utah. That 
on the 5th day of November, 1992, she caused to be posted in three 
public places in Carbon County, copies of the herein attached 
notice of application for: FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND APPOINTMENT 
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
TO-WIT: One copy on the bulletin board, front 
corridor, Carbon County Court Complex, Price, Utah; one copy on 
the bulletin board for legal notices, corridor, City Hall, Helper, 
Utah; and one copy on the bulletin board for legal notices at the 
John W. Galbreath Office, East Carbon, Utah—all in Carbon County, 
Utah. 
That on the 5th day of November, 1992, she mailed true 
and correct copies of the hereunto attached notice to the persons 
listed below and directed to their respective places of residence 
r.nr\m *3 
as shown after their names; that the copies so mailed were 
enclosed in a sealed envelope and deposited in the United States 
Mail, with postage thereon prepaid: 
1. Carol Schroader, c/o Ralph W. Rasmussen, Jr., 389 North 
University Ave., P. 0. Box 432, Provo, UT 84603 
2. Starr Pelton, 321 Cameron Drive, Osburn, ID 83849-1023 
3. William James Naillon, 498 Vick Drive, Santa Cruz, CA 95060 
4. George Francis Naillon, 11103 Mt. Vernon Road, Auburn, CA 
95603 
5. Margie Ann Naillon, c/o William J. Naillon, 498 Vick Drive, 
Santa Cruz, CA 95060 
6. Patricia Carol Naillon/Candelaria, 2775 Croft Drive, San Jose, 
CA 95148 
7. John Rolland Naillon, Jr., 9507 LaPorte Road, Bangor, CA 
95914 
8. Michael George Naillon, Sr. , 10934 SE 254 Place, Kent, WA 
98031 
9. Danny William Naillon, 413 San Juan, Los Banos, CA 93633* 
10. Tammy Michelle Naillon, 2775 Croft Drive, San Jose, CA 95148 
11. Robert Gitlin, 398 West 2900 South, Price, UT 84501 
12. James D. Gilson, Susan G. Lawrence, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY, Attorneys at Law, 50 South Main Street, Suite 
1600, P.O. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Ut 84145 
13. Nick Sampinos, Attorney at Law, 80 West Main, Suite 201, 
Price, UT 84501 
Clerk/Deputy 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of 
November, 1992. 
elm? k-/ Deputy (/ 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
James D. Gilson (5472) 
Susan G. Lawrence (5305) 
Attorneys for the Petitioner 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate 
) FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL 
Of ) AND APPOINTMENT OF 
) PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
MILDRED C. MEEKS, ) 
Deceased, ) Probate No. 923-43 
Upon consideration of the Petition for Formal Probate 
of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative filed 
by Robert Gitlin, on the 27th day of October, 1992, the Court 
finds as follows: 
1. The Petition for Formal Probate of Will and 
Formal Appointment of Personal Representative is complete. 
2. The petitioner has made oath or affirmation that 
the statements contained in the Petition are true to the best of 
his knowledge and belief. 
3. The petitioner appears from the Petition to be an 
interested person as defined by the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
c r \ r ;u , « I U l l I I I L C:-L7u 
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4. On the basis of the statements in the Petition, 
venue is proper because the decedent was domiciled in Carbon 
County, Utah at the time of her death. 
5. Any required notice has been given or waived. 
6. The decedent' s Last Will and Testament of MILDRED 
C. MEEKS constitutes the decedent' s Last Will and Testament. 
7. The Petition does not indicate the existence of a 
possible unrevoked testamentary instrument which may relate to 
property subject to the laws of this state, and which is not 
filed for probate in this court. 
8. The Petition does not relate to one or more of a 
known series of testamentary instruments (other than Wills and 
Codicils), the latest of which does not expressly revoke the 
earlier. 
9. It appears from the Petition that the time limit 
for formal appointment has not expired. 
10. Based on the statements in the Petition, ?>.cbert 
Gitlin, the person whose appointment is sought, is nominated in 
the Last Will and Testament of the decedent as the personal 
representative, is qualified to act as personal representative, 
and has a prior right to appointment. 
11. On the basis of the statements in the Petition, 
no personal representative has been appoinred in this state or 
elsewhere. 
-2-
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12. The names, addresses and relationships of the 
heirs and devisees of the decedent are as follows: 
Name Address Relationship 
Carol Schroader 
Starr Pelton 
William James 
Naillon 
George Francis 
Naillon 
Margie Ann Naillon 
Patricia Carol 
Naillon/Candelaria 
John Rolland 
Naillon, Jr. 
Michael George 
Naillon, Sr. 
Danny William 
Naillon 
Tammy Michelle 
Naillon 
c/o Ralph W. Rasmus sen, Jr. 
389 North University Ave. 
P. 0. Box 432 
Provo, UT 84603 
321 Cameron Drive 
Osburn, ID 83849-1023 
498 Vick Drive 
Santa Cruz, CA 95060 
11103 Mt. Vernon Road 
Auburn, CA 95603 
936 West Julian Street 
San Jose, CA 95008 
2775 Croft Drive 
San Jose, CA 95148 
9507 LaPorte Road 
Bangor, CA 95914 
10934 SE 254 Place 
Kent, WA 93031 
413 San Juan 
Los Banos, CA 93 635 
2775 Croft Drive 
San Jose, CA 95148 
beneficiary 
under will 
sister 
nephew 
nephew 
niece 
grand niece 
grand nephew 
grand nephew 
grand nephew 
grand niece 
All of the foregoing individuals are adults. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Petition is hereby granted, the 
Last Will and Testament of MILDRED C. MEEKS, dated October 18, 
198 8, is hereby formally pxobared, Robext Gitiin is hereby 
-3-
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appointed personal representative of the decedent' s estate, to 
act without bond in an unsupervised administration, and upon 
qualification and acceptance Letters Testamentary shall be 
issued to the said personal representative. 
DATED this / ^ day of ' / % S ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 9 9 2 . 
BY THE 
184M8971. 1 
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SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE DATE: Nov 16, 1992 - 9:30 am 
ELECTRONIC RECORDING CASE NO: Probate No. 923-43 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE Nick Sampinos 
OF 
MILDRED C. MEEKS, Deceased 
MINUTE ENTRY 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT: FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL & 
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
The Court advised counsel that an attorney from California 
had called advising that he was representing George Frandsen 
Nailon and Mr. Nailon was requesting time to confer with local 
counsel. There was objection from Mr. Sampinos. Said petition 
being verified and noticed for hearing, and there being no 
protests on file, the Court now 
FINDS AND ORDERS: That the document entitled Last Will and 
Testament of Mildred C. Meeks is in truth and fact her last will 
and the same is admitted to probate. The Court will appoint 
Robert Gitlin as personal representative of this estate upon 
taking of the oath. No bond will be required. 
bap 
Tape 92-59/3700 
009018 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
CARBON COUNTY 
-OOQ-
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
MILDRED C. MEEKS. 
Case No. 923700043 
ORIGINAL 
-o0o-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 16th day of November, 
1992, the above-entitled matter came on.for hearing before 
the HONORABLE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
NICK SAMPINOS 
Attorney at Law 
80 West Main, #201 
Price, Utah 84501 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, C.S.R. 
3241 SOUTH 4840 MEST 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84123 
PHONE: 966-4862 
r* -t ,i a* r% ^ 
1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: Let's see, Probate No. 90-23-43, 
4 matter of the Estate of Mildred C. Meeks. 
5 Mr. Sampinos, I just received a call from an 
6 attorney in California who claimed to be representing one 
7 of the heirs that lives in California, claimed he just got 
8 the notice Friday, although the mailing certificate says it 
9 went out on the 5th of November. 
10 Let's see, let me get his name off the mailing 
11 affidavit. Oh, here it is over here. George Frances 
12 Naylan is the name. The attorney's name is Rod Shepherd, 
13 and he requested that we give Mr. George Frances Naylan 
14 time to consult an attorney here about the matter and I — 
15 well, I told him that I wouldn't do it unless you consented 
16 b e c a u s e — i n other words, the notices have gone out and 
17 there isn't any written protest on file. 
IS MR. SAMPINOS: Well, and I would pose an objection 
13 We've had commnnicati on with the Naylan people, the notices 
20 did go out and we'd like to get this rolling. There's not 
21 that much involved in this estate, and I'd like t o — 
22 I THE COURT: Is t h e — i s the petitioner named in 
23 the Vill? 
24 MR. SAMPINOS: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: As the personal representative? 
f\*%*< t ?l^ 
him 
is a 
who-
you 
them 
$100 
$10, 
that 
MR. 
THE 
that 
waste of 
-whe] 
got, 
MR. 
THE 
SAMPINOS: Yes. 
COURT: Well, of 
was usually the < 
everybody 
SAMPINOS: 
1s time 
And I 
COURT: Because < 
re you have as j 
about— 
MR. 
THE 
from out 
,000 
000 < 
and : 
MR. 
THE 
and— 
SAMPINOS: 
COURT: A 
of state 
tiany as 
Seven 
whole 
always • 
course, I tried to explain to 
sase, that filing objections 
, but — 
feel the same, your Honor. 
a lot of times, you get heirs 
youfve got here, what have 
or eight of them. 
list of heirs. And some of 
think that Aunt Susie left 
L'm not getting my share— 
SAMPINOS: 
COURT: -
Right • 
-when she actually left maybe 
MR. SAMPINOS: Or less. 
THE COURT: That's not an unusual scenario we run 
into from cecple that are nn^ ^^ il*i ^ T* with facts , but I 
hate to beg up thee time of the Court. 
So I told him if you—if you objected, I wouldn't 
give him any time, but if you consented, we would continue 
it for two weeks, but— 
MR. SAMPINOS: I'll object. 
^ 1 1 •*- •! ~»-»«L. TfU^^^I ^4- -*-V^ ^msun^^mA^ S h C W 
that this oetition is verified, it's noticed for hearina at 
3 
1 this day and hour, in accordance with with our rules of 
2 procedure. There are no protests on file. 
3
 The Court finds that the document filed with the 
4
 Court entitled Last Will and Testament of Mildred C. Meeks 
5 is in truth and fact her last will and testament. The 
6 Court hereby appoints Robert Gitlin as the personal 
7 representative of this estate. He will qualify upon taking 
8 the oath. No bond will be required. 
9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The 16th? 
10 THE COURT: The 16th, yeah. 
11 MR. SAMPINOS: Thank you, your Honor* 
12 THE COURT: Let's see. Barbara, I told 
13 Mr. Shepherd he could check back with you later on today 
14 and you'd tell him what we did in this case, out of couxtesy 
15 t o him. 
16 (Whereupon, t h i s h e a r i n g was concluded . ) 
17 
13 
19 
20 
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* * * 
TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
3 
4 I I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify that I am a 
5 transcriber for Penny C. Abbott, Certified Shorthand 
6 Reporter and Certified Court Transcriber of tape recorded 
7 court proceedings; that I received the electronically 
8 recorded tape of the within matter and under her supervision] 
9 J have transcribed the same into typewriting, and that the 
10 I foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 4, to the best of my 
^ ability constitute a full, true and correct transcription, 
12 I except where it is indicated the tape recorded court 
13 I proceedings were inaudible* 
14 J I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
15 I attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or steno-
16 grapher of either party or of the attorney of either party, 
17 or otherwise interested in the event of this suit 
IS DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 7th day of 
13 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
December 1993. 
Transcriber f 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, PENNY C. ABBOTT, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, do hereby certify that I received the electroni-
cally recorded tape (No, 92-59) in the matter of the 
Estate of Mildred C, Meeks, and that I caused it to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, true, and 
correct transcription of said hearing so recorded and 
transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
from 1 to 4, inclusive, and that said pages constitute an 
accurate and complete transcription of all the proceedings 
adduced at the hearing and contained on the tape except 
where it is indicated that the proceeding was inaudible* 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 7th day of December, 1993. 
~xr 
^GM*£t 
Penny C.^bbott, C.S.R. 
License #93 
My commission expires: Sept. 24, 1996 
p. r\ n i Q ^ 
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•SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
MILDRED C. MEEKS, 
Deceased. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Probate No. 923700043 ES 
The Court having reviewed the file herein finds that a 
Petition to Probate was filed and Order granting same was 
subsequently entered. Subsequent thereto, a Petition to Vacate was 
filed by Petitioner Naillon. The Court deems this to be a Motion 
to Vacate under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
hereafter "Motion to Vacate", Memorandum in support was attached 
thereto. Subsequently, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition of Naillon 
was filed by the attorney for the Personal Representative together 
with a Memorandum in Support thereof. The Court concludes that 
this should have been an Objection to the Motion to Vacate and 
attached Memorandum in Support thereof, hereafter "Objection". At 
the same time a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Naillon was 
filed, pursuant to Rule 56(e), together with a Memorandum in 
Support thereof. A document entitled Assent to Personal 
Representative's Motion was also filed.,- The Court deems same to be 
a joinder by Carol Schrcader in the Objection filed on behalf of 
the Personal Representative and for the reasons set forth therein. 
000145 
2 
Subsequently, Naillon filed a response to the Motion to Strike 
Affidavit on March 26, 1993 and also filed a reply to the 
"Objection11 and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the 
Petition. Subsequent thereto, on behalf of the Personal 
Representative, a "Reply Memorandum" in Support of the Motion to 
Dismiss was filed and an Objection to that Reply Memorandum was 
filed on behalf of Naillon. Finally, a response to Objection to 
the Reply Memorandum was filed on behalf of the Personal 
Representative. The last three filed documents appear to 
misperceive the procedural posture of the case, at least as far as 
the Court has concluded and outlined above. 
The Court concludes that the matters at issue herein, as of 
the present time, are first, should the Affidavit of Naillon be 
stricken and secondly, whether the Motion to Vacate under Rule 
60(b) should be granted. The Court herein concludes that the 
Affidavit although somewhat inartfully drafted, e.g. drawing 
conclusions and not setting forth facts upon which those 
conclusions were drawn and not setting forth factual information 
from individuals who may have known the deceased and could have 
testified (by Affidavit) of her mental condition at the time the 
Will was executed, does never the less, provide some factual 
information and the Court is able to ferret out the other 
conclusionary matters. Having said that however, the Court finds 
the Affidavit to be insufficient to give rise to a justifiable 
f\ r\ r\ -4 t r% 
3 
reason for setting aside the original Order of Judge Bunnell. This 
is so, even though as is necessary under these circumstances, the 
Court must view the Affidavit and Motion of the moving party, 
Naillon, in the light most favorable to Movant. 
The Court does conclude that the Motion was filed within the 
time limitations set forth herein and does not believe that the 
Motion was a substitute Motion for an appeal which may otherwise 
have cut off the remedies available to Petitioner. The standing 
issue raised in the pleadings of the Personal Representative is 
misperceived. The Court concludes that an individual to have 
standing in this situation, need only be-an interested party. It 
is true that a number of individuals would have priority to 
appointment, but it is further true that the Petitioner Naillon 
herein has standing as being an interested party and in the event 
of relinquishment by the other parties might actually be entitled 
to appointment as the Personal Representative, although based upon 
the pleadings herein, it seems unlikely that such a relinquishment 
would take place. Finally, in the event that Petitioner Naillon 
had filed a Petition for Declaration for Intestacy along with his 
Motion to Vacate, and had set forth therein sufficient allegations 
for the Court to conclude that a hearing thereon must necessarily 
be held, there would have been an opportunity for Petitioner 
Naillon to produce evidence showing undue influence. 
The only factual allegation contained in the Affidavit that 
cr>n,i /*7 
4 
bears upon some undo influence at the time of the execution of the 
Will is really inferential, and that is from the fact that Mr. 
Gitlin was named in the Will as a donee' five years ago and was 
named as a grantee in a deed executed seven days prior to the 
decedents death, at a time when Affiant believed she may have been 
in pain and under the influence of some unspecified drugs. We are 
asked to infer that Gitlin exercised undue influence over the 
Decedent's execution of the Will. That inference requires a leap 
of faith that this Co^pt cannot make. 
DATED this y j i a y of September, 1993. 
K. HALLIDAY 
District Judge 
r% n n -f /! O 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Q ^ day of September, 1993, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
James D. Gilson 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Jeffrey R. Hill 
HILL, • HARRISON, HILL & FISHER 
Attorneys at Law 
3 319 North University Avenue, #2 00 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Ralph W, Rasmussen 
BRADFORD & BRADY 
Attorneys at Law 
389 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Secretary u c ' 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY"C " ^ TAJF f":!"'"/jt'l^°^^T 
James D. Gilson (5472) 
Susan G. Lawrence (5305) 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Robert Gitlin, 
Personal Representative of the Estate 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF CARBON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION 
ORDER 
In the 
MILDRED 
Matter 
C. 
of 
Of 
MEEKS, 
the Estate ) 
Deceased. ) 
Probate No. 923700043 
Pending before the Court is the Petition to Vacate or 
Set Aside Order that was filed by petitioner George F. Naillon, 
through his attorney Jeffrey R. Hill, which was opposed by 
Robert Gitlin, the Personal Representative of decendant' s 
estate, through his attorney James D. Gilson. Carol Schroader, 
through her attorney Ralph W. Rasmussen, Jr., joined in the 
opposition filed by the Personal Representative. Also pending 
is the Motion to Strike Affidavit of George F. Naillon, which 
was filed by the Personal Representative. 
The Court, having reviewed the file herein, and 
having reviewed the briefs filed in connection with the above 
referenced Petition and Motion to Strike, and based upon the 
reasons set forth in the Court' s Memorandum Decision dated 
September 3, 1993 in connection therewith, 
nnn 1 rz r\ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of George F. Naillon is denied; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition to Vacate or 
Set Aside Order filed by petitioner^-£Jaillon is denied. 
DATED this // - day of Septsmbex, 1993. 
Bf Mill 
for George F. Naillon 
-2-
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HILL, HARRISON & HILL 
Jeffrey R. Hill (#4596) 
F. McKay Johnson (#3725) 
3319 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
MILDRED C. MEEKS, 
Deceased. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
i Probate No. 923700043 
Petitioner, George F. Naillon in the above-entitled 
matter, by and through his attorney of record Jeffrey R. Hillf 
hereby appeals the Order dated October 12, 1993, denying 
Petitioner's Petition to Vacate or Set Aside Order. 
Petitioner appeals from the Order entered by Judge Bruce K. 
Halliday of the above-entitled District Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 1993. 
, J e f ^ r ^ R . Hill / ** r 
Attorae^i^r Petitioner 
ii i 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal on this 
day of November, 1993, by first-class U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
James D. Gilson 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
50 S. Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Ralph W. Rasmussen 
389 N. University Ave. 
Provo, UT 84601 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
January 25, 1994 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
James D. Gilson 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys at Law 
50 S. Main, #1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
In The Matter of The Estate 
of Mildred C. Meeks. 
George F. Naillon, 
Appellant. No. 930565 
923700043 
Appellee's motion to summarily dismiss appeal is this day 
denied, and the court defers its ruling until plenary 
presentation and consideration of the case. Utah R. App. P. 
10(f). 
Upon denial of motion for summary disposition and 
pursuant to Rule 13 of the Utah R. App. P. the record index 
on appeal has been filed. The appellant's brief is due 
March 7, 1994. The record in this case may be withdrawn from 
the district court only upon written request of the attorney 
of record. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
